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3: INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS: REVERSING THE 
CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF TAX POLICY
Richard Murphy 
Changes in tax policy have tightened the grip of big business on tax 
affairs across Europe, giving undue influence to a tiny minority 
of tax payers. Reforms to HMRC and European institutions are 
needed to make tax policy better serve everyone’s interests. 
Tax avoidance has changed. At one time it was all about large companies making use of aggressive techniques, often involving tax havens, to reduce the amount of 
tax that they might pay. It was good business for those who 
sold tax avoidance services and most especially the bankers, 
lawyers and accountants engaged in this activity. Then along 
came the tax justice movement to spoil their show. Whether 
coincidentally or as a consequence, it seems likely that the 
large company UK corporation tax gap resulting from tax 
avoidance has reduced as a result. I no longer think it as high 
as my 2008 estimate of £12bn a year. Indeed, it may not now 
exceed £5bn a year.
That should be celebrated as good news. It shows that tax 
campaigning can work. Unfortunately, however, as one gap 
recedes another one is emerging into view. And it is not one 
that is just a consequence of sharp practice by clever corpo-
rates: it is an intended consequence of government policy. 
It means that I now think that the total UK large company 
corporate tax gap has increased even higher than it ever was, 
Tax for our times
26
to £13bn a year. This is the consequence of the new ‘corpora-
tion tax policy gap’, which might be as high as £8bn a year. 
This new tax gap represents the gain that large companies 
have made since 2008 as a result of the extensive changes 
in UK tax policy that they have secured. As example, the 
corporation tax rate for large (but not small) companies has 
reduced from 30 per cent to 20 per cent over that period. In 
addition, whilst UK multinational groups were once taxed, 
at least in theory, on their worldwide income, they are now 
only taxed in the UK on the income they have arising in this 
country. This is in direct contrast, for example, to the vast 
majority of individual UK citizens, who are still taxed on 
everything they earn (unless, that is, they’re non-doms). This 
policy change has increased the appeal of tax havens to UK 
based multinational companies enormously. And numerous 
other changes, such as more generous reliefs for R&D and 
the tax treatment of offshore treasury functions have also 
greatly helped big business.
The result is that in 2015 the UK corporation tax yield 
(excluding North Sea revenues) will be £8bn less than fore-
cast in 2010. Part of this may be down to growth not meeting 
expectations, but at least £4bn may be due to tax rate reduc-
tion, as forthcoming report for the TUC will demonstrate. 
Meanwhile, it is easy to allocate the rest of the shortfall to 
specific reliefs and allowances given based on Office for 
Budget Responsibility and Treasury forecasts at the time 
that they were introduced.
That then raises the question of how this has happened? 
Why is it that big business has received such an extraordi-
nary deal since 2010 when no one else has? Could it be that 
this is down to HMRC governance and the way in which tax 
decision making is now undertaken in the UK?
When HMRC was formed in 2005, its governance arrange-
ments were explicitly based on the interests of big business. 
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It was given a board that was required to have a significant 
number of non-executive directors, all of whom, including 
the chair, must be drawn from the big business community. 
There are about 700 companies that meet this brief in the 
UK at present. HMRC was, therefore, explicitly organised 
so that their views were not just represented, but heard loud 
and clear within its governance processes. The remaining 31 
million direct taxpayers in the UK were, in contrast, denied 
a voice.
We have, as a result, reached the absurd situation where 
the current chair of HMRC is a former senior tax partner 
in KPMG, a firm whose US branch was fined $456 million 
for criminal tax abuse in the USA as recently as 2005. Also 
on the board is a former CEO of Npower, who happened to 
be director of that group’s Maltese subsidiaries which used 
to route interest payments from the UK to Germany in a 
manner designed to save tens if not hundreds of millions  of 
pounds in tax. Furthermore, over recent years people asso-
ciated with PWC, Tesco and Barclays have also served. It 
would be hard to make up such an arrangement of poachers 
turned gamekeepers. Many of the large companies accused 
of tax avoidance in the UK, and those who advise them, now 
have extraordinary institutional influence over the UK’s tax 
authority, whose prime task is meant to be challenging the 
arrangements those very same companies create.
This is not the only area where large businesses have been 
afforded undue influence in the tax law making process due 
to reforms that superficially appear to be about making it 
more accountable. The consultation processes now regularly 
undertaken with regard to proposed tax reforms and draft 
legislation are another area where a process that appears to 
have democratic intent has actually been captured by big 
business and its representatives. They can do this because 
only they can afford the time and effort, and sometimes only 
Tax for our times
28
they have the spare specific expertise required, to engage in 
these consultation processes.
A similar story can be told of many of the committees at 
the OECD, where business representatives have dominated 
all consultation hearings on, for example, the Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting project that is intended to tackle tax 
avoidance. This is because few others have the time and 
resources to send people to take part in this process. 
The situation is slightly different in the EU, but the effect is 
the same, with many tax and accounting consultations also 
dominated by the voices of these companies and accounting 
firms. Accounting provides the best example here (partly 
because much of tax law is devolved to member states). In 
2001 the European Commission encouraged the creation of 
EFRAG – the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group. 
Its task was to advise on the development of accounting 
standards, an issue that now has significant crossover with 
tax issues on such matters as country-by-country report-
ing. The advisory group is, however, made up entirely of 
accounting, banking and insurance groups: civil society is 
not represented at all. 
The consequences of such selective consultation in the UK 
are clear. HMRC, as a non-ministerial UK department, has 
ended up with an unusual range of permanent secretaries. 
Some have been over-dominant, appearing to have been 
accepted as policy makers in the absence of ministerial guid-
ance. Meanwhile, others appear to serve the interests of tax 
abusers, enabling tax evaders to use a tax saving disclosure 
scheme that they were previously excluded from using. 
The overall result is that massively undue influence has been 
given to a tiny minority of taxpayers in the whole tax setting 
process. That it is these taxpayers that have unduly benefit-
ted, wittingly or unwittingly, as a result of enormous tax 
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cuts that no other group in society has enjoyed is the almost 
inevitable outcome.
The question is, then, what can be done about this? I have 
four suggestions.
The first is to appoint a cabinet-level minister to be respon-
sible for HMRC who would be answerable for it in both 
parliament and to other departments and agencies. This 
need not in any way breach taxpayer confidentiality, but is 
essential for accountability on such a key political issue. At 
present, as a non-ministerial department, HMRC frequently 
does not take part in inter-departmental discussions related 
to relevant policy making, which it has a clear interest 
in. We need to sweep away the historical anachronism of 
the current unaccountable situation that dates back to the 
ancient disputes between crown and parliament, and which 
should have been left behind in the civil war era. 
Second, HMRC needs to be subject to more rigorous and 
independent review than has been provided by the National 
Audit Office. When that Office went to exceptional lengths to 
try to deny the supply of information to the Public Accounts 
Committee during the last parliament it proved itself unfit 
to be the agent of our elected representatives seeking to hold 
HMRC to account. What we need instead is an Office for Tax 
Responsibility, well-funded and well-staffed, accountable to 
either the Treasury or Public Accounts Committee (or maybe 
both, in joint session, rather like the joint defence commit-
tee arrangements). As Margaret Hodge has proved, it is for 
our politicians to hold HMRC to account, but they need the 
resources to do so and such an Office for Tax Responsibility 
could provide that. If it were also to review all tax policy 
proposals and associated forecasts independently of HMRC 
and the Treasury parliamentary debate on these issues 
would be vastly better informed.
Tax for our times
30
Third, the tax consultations and committees that meet 
on a regular basis with HMRC and represent the views of 
taxpayers are important. However, it is for this reason that 
public funding should be supplied to ensure that those who 
have opinions that need to be heard can be truly engaged in 
these processes. Any group seeking to make representation 
should be able to bid for funding to cover the reasonable 
costs of making submissions to HMRC during a consultation 
process, such as hiring expert opinion and costs incurred 
in attending hearings. Only then will ordinary taxpayers, 
small businesses, pensioners, charities and others be truly 
represented in these processes.
And last, HMRC board appointments should be subject 
to a quota system so that it is ensured that a wide range of 
taxpayer interests are represented on that board. After all, 
management experience is not limited to big business and as 
HMRC has to engage with society in all its manifestations it 
is vital that its Board represents those various interests.
The same lessons need to be learned elsewhere. It is absurd 
that neither the OECD nor EU will fund representations 
from those stakeholders from whom they seek engagement 
(including those from developing countries in the case of 
the OECD), and instead demand that those wishing to make 
representations must be self-funded. The resulting processes 
are inevitably biased and unrepresentative as a conse-
quence. Relatively modest sums expended on the reasonable 
costs incurred of those making representations could ensure 
that consultations were open and balanced. 
Tax is too important to be left to very narrow interests, but 
that is what has happened in the UK and worldwide over the 
last few years. It is high time that this was changed, and now 
is the time to begin the process. These suggestions would 
take us a long way in the right direction.
